Abstract: The security of a password authentication scheme using smart cards proposed by Khan et al. is analyzed. Four kinds of attacks are presented in different scenarios. The analyses show that the scheme is insecure for practical application.
Introduction
User authentication is the essential security mechanism for remote login systems in which a password-based authentication scheme is the most commonly used technique to provide authentication between the legal users and the remote server.
In 1981, Lamport [1] proposed a password-based authentication scheme using password tables to authenticate remote users over insecure network. In Lamport's scheme, password table is used to verify the legitimacy of users. In 2000, Hwang et al. pointed out that once the password table was stolen or modified in this scheme, the whole authentication system will be affected [2] . Therefore, they proposed a remote user authentication scheme using smartcard without maintaining a password table. Afterwards, many schemes have been proposed to enhance the security and practicability [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] .
A common feature among most of the published schemes is that the user's identity is static in all the transaction sessions, which may leak some information about that user and can create risk of ID-theft during the message transmission over an insecure channel. To overcome this risk, Das et al. proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme [12] . Compared with other authentication schemes, this scheme has many advantages. In the scheme, the server does not maintain any verifier table, and moreover, the scheme is based on the one-way secure hash function, so its realization is simple and reliable. However, Das et al.'s scheme is completely insecure [13] . It failed to protect the anonymity of a user [14] and is susceptible to the impersonation attack [15] , and the guessing attack [16] .
To overcome the security pitfalls of Das et al.'s scheme, Liao et al. proposed an improved scheme. Misbahuddin et al. [17] demonstrated that Liao et al.'s scheme cannot withstand impersonation attack, reflection attack and is completely insecure as a user can successfully log on to a remote system with a random password.
In 2009, Wang et al. [18] proposed a dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme and claimed that their scheme is more efficient and secure than Das et al.'s scheme. However, Khan et al. [19] identify that Wang et al.'s scheme has the following flaws: no provision of user's anonymity during authentication, inability to offer user free choice in choosing his password, *Corresponding author. E-mail: hedebiao@163.com, Tel:+0086015307184927, Fax: +008602787817667 vulnerability to insider attack, no provision for revocation of lost or stolen smart card, and does provide session key agreement. To remedy these security flaws, they proposed an enhanced authentication scheme. They claimed their scheme covers all the identified weaknesses of Wang et al.'s scheme and is more secure and efficient for practical application environment.
However, in this paper, we show Khan et al.'s scheme suffers from three weaknesses: 1) inability to protect the user's anonymity; 2) the session-key problem; 3) inefficiency of the double secret keys; and 4) other drawbacks. That is, it fails to fully meet the security requirements that this type of scheme should achieve.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews Khan et al.'s scheme, Section 3 elaborates on the weakness of their scheme, Section 4 concludes this paper.
Review of Khan et al.'s scheme
The notations used throughout this paper are described as in the following. ⊕ : bitwise XOR operation. ||: concatenation operation Khan et al.'s scheme involves five phases, the registration phase, the login phase, the authentication phase, the password change phase, and the lost smart card revocation phase. We just give the first four phases here, since the last phase has nothing about our analysis.
Registration phase. In this phase, the user i U initially registers with the server S . 
The session-key problem
As noted by Blake-Wilson et al. [22] , a number of security properties of key agreement have been proposed and the properties have been used to analyze the security of key agreement. The properties include known-key secrecy, unknown key-share resilience, no key control, key-compromise impersonation resilience and perfect forward secrecy. Forward secrecy requires that, if long-term private keys of one or more entities are compromised, the secrecy of previous session keys established by honest entities can be unaffected.
When analyzing the forward secrecy, Khan et al. claimed even if the server's secret keys x and y happens to be compromised, an adversary cannot impersonate legitimate users by using the revealed keys, and concluded their scheme can preserve the forward secrecy of secret keys x and y . They made a mistake in understanding the mean of forward secrecy. In fact, their scheme can't provide the forward secrecy. Once the adversary get the value x , y and some ciphertext translated c between the user and the server, he can compute the session key through the following method.
1) The attacker gets the value i ID using the method described above and let i N be zero.
2) The attacker computes 3) The attacker computes the session key 
Inefficiency of the double secret keys
We can see that the scheme of Khan et al. requires S to keep two keys secret, i.e., the secret key x and y . In common sense, it is possible to achieve the user authentication and key agreement service by using only one secret key. Therefore, two secret keys mean more overheads without the security enhancement for the whole authentication system.
Other drawbacks
In the step 2) of password change phase in Khan et al.'s scheme, the smart card checks if In password authentication, DoS attack can cause permanent error on authentication by introducing unexpected data during the procedures of authentication. The most vulnerable procedure is the password changing phase since it usually refreshes the data in storage. If an attacker can modify the password, or tamper the message containing password with valid data format, the updated password or its related verification data will then be different from what the user expects. The user can never pass the subsequent authentication thereby. In Khan et al.'s scheme, the password changing phase is performed on the user terminal with smart cards, i.e., the user can change his password without communicating with the server [19] . This enhances the security of password changing as no sensitive message needs to be transmitted over the insecure network. Meanwhile, it relieves the overhead of the/a server. However, due to the drawbacks of design, it is still possible to load a DoS attack on password changing in their scheme. 
Then the adversary can carry out the off-line password guessing attack using the relation. The detailed description of the attack is as follows. The adversary can obtain the secret information , i i r J , and i L stored in the stolen smart card by monitoring the power consumption [20] or by analyzing the leaked information [21] . Then he can carry out the password guess attack using 
Conclusion
Smart card-based user authentication technology has been widely deployed in various kinds of applications, such as remote host login, withdrawals from automated cash dispensers, and physical entry to restricted areas.
In [19] , Khan et al. proposed a password authentication scheme using smart cards and demonstrated its immunity against various attacks. However, by reviewing of their scheme and analyzing its security, four kinds of weakness, i.e., 1) inability to protect the user's anonymity; 2) the session-key problem; 3) inefficiency of the double secret keys; and 4) other drawbacks are presented in different scenarios. The analyses show that the scheme is insecure for practical application.
